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October 18, 2018

Presentation at Roundtable on Evaluating Economic Development Tax
Incentives, sponsored by National Conference of State Legislatures

Presentation based on 3 of my recent
papers, particularly 2nd
1. “But For” Percentages for Economic Development
Incentives: What percentage estimates are plausible based
on the research literature? (June 2018; Upjohn Working
Paper 18-289)
2. Who Benefits from Economic Development Incentives? How
Incentive Effects on Local Incomes and the Income
Distribution Vary with Different Assumptions about Incentive
Policy and the Local Economy (March 2018; Upjohn Institute
Technical Report No. 18-034)

3. What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local
Economies? (May 2018; Upjohn Institute Technical Report
18-035)
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Main questions addressed in this
presentation
• What should we count as benefits and costs of economic
development tax incentives?

• What are main factors affecting these benefits and costs?
(“Factors” = features of how local economy behaves and/or
policy parameters)
• What are reasonable assumptions for analysts to make about
these factors, based on the empirical research literature?
• How do different policy choices affect these benefits and
costs?
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Incentive benefits and costs should be
measured as increases in real after-tax income
per capita of local residents
•

Ideal: local residents’ change in “well-being”, adjusted for amenities, but income per
capita is practical proxy

•

Narrower than increase in gross state product/state personal income, which reflects
incomes of in-migrants. In-migrants gain little, as could have moved elsewhere with
similar outcomes.

•

In other words, welfare analysis of STATE policy is quite different from welfare
analysis of NATIONAL policy because of internal migration.

•

Much broader than increase in state tax revenues, in 4 respects: (1) should include
locals; (2) should subtract out increased needs for public services, due to inmigration, which is considerable, and usually offsets 90% plus of increased tax
revenue; (3) should add in increased earnings per capita of state residents due to
higher employment rates & wages, which will usually be at least 4 times fiscal
benefits; (4) should also add in increased property values, and effects on locallyowned businesses.

•

Focusing on fiscal benefits alone is weird because it assumes state and local
governments are trying to maximize state/local fisc, which is weird goal.
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Incentive Given
to Business

Effect on business decisions

Multiplier

Other economic effects

Some businesses locate or
expand that otherwise would
not have (but for >0%)

Initial jobs create local
jobs in suppliers,
retailers, clusters.

Boost to labor and
housing demand
increases wages and
property values.

In-state beneficiaries
Increased profits
due to incentives for
local owners.

Opportunity cost

Net incentive costs
must be paid for.
Higher taxes or
spending cuts will
have negative
demand or supplyside effects.

Displacement

Additional income

Increased population

New businesses
may compete
with and harm
existing local
businesses.

…for local residents
who would
otherwise not be
employed.

Labor demand drives
migration (70-80%),
increasing need for
government services
(90% of revenue).

Workers and
property owners

Business costs
increase

Higher wages and
property values
increase their
income.

Reduces jobs,
& profits of
local owners.

Unaffected decisions
Some incentives reward
businesses for what
they would have done
anyway, or substitute
for other job creation
(but for < 25%).

Revenue

Additional tax
revenue partly
offsets the cost of
the incentive.

Key determinant of incentive benefits and
costs: “but for” percentage
• “But for” percentage: percentage of incented jobs that actually
increased jobs in state, compared to counterfactual of this incentive
not being provided.

• 3 reasons this percentage should always be assumed to be less
than 100%: (1) always some probability that project would have
gone on at same scale anyway; (2) even if incentive made
difference, project might have occurred at reduced scale; (3) even if
this firm would not have done project without incentive, the land and
labor utilized might have attracted other firms.
• Review of research literature: “but for” is likely less than 25% for
“average” incentives.
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But-for research literature review
• None of 34 estimates reviewed is based on randomized control trial
(RCT).
• 23 of 34 are likely positively biased: survey of firms or economic
developers; comparison of incented firms or areas with nonincented, which is biased because incentives by design go to
growing firms or areas.

• 4 of 34 are likely negatively biased: incented firms or areas seem
likely to be negatively chosen, for example comparison is of future
growth of more or less incented areas in past.
• 7 estimates have no obvious bias: mostly comparisons of different
states’ incentive structures.
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But-for research literature review
Figure 1: Median “But For" Percentage
100

50

23.5
12.7

0

0
All studies (34 estimates)

Positively biased estimates
(23 estimates)

3.4

Negatively biased estimates No obvious bias to estimates
(4 estimates)
(7 estimates)

NOTE: State and local business tax literature: range of 4–21% for average incentive. Model assumes average
incentive yields 12%. Foxconn (10.7 x average) is 76%.
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Multiplier research literature review
•

Typical manufacturing input-output multipliers at state level are between 2
and 3. Model baseline assumes 2.5.

•

Cost feedbacks reduce by 1/4th to 1/3rd. In model, baseline of 2.5 yields
effective multiplier of 1.74. 2 to 3 range yields 1.43 to 2.05.

•

High-tech multipliers may be as high as 6 (Moretti research), which exceeds
plausible I/O values (effective multiplier after cost feedbacks is 3.91).
Probably due to “agglomeration economies”: productivity spillovers due to
size of city or industry cluster, which allows for more specialized suppliers,
better matching, and knowledge spillovers.

•

Locally-owned smaller firms may have multipliers greater by 0.25, due to
greater local purchases.

•

IMPLAN and other input-output models don’t include cost feedbacks. REMI
does, but also adds in extra agglomeration multiplier effects.
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Effects of Emp on Emp/Pop vs. Pop
• Logically, boost to local jobs must either boost local employment
rate or local population, as E = (E/P) × P.
• Created jobs are directly filled by: (1) Employed locals; (2) Nonemployed locals; (3) Non-locals.
• But category (1) yields local vacancies, that are filled in same 3
ways. Vacancy chain only ends when the new job leads to: (2) job
for non-employed local; (3) job for non-local.
• Proportion that goes to non-employed local vs. non-local depends in
part on how incented firm hires. But also depends on how multiplier
jobs are filled, and how subsequent vacancies are filled. So
depends on factors such as: (1) local unemployment (higher = more
effect on E/P), or (2) better local workforce system (more effect on
E/P).
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LR Effects of Emp on Pop: surprisingly high or low? (SR effect is
0.40 on pop, 0.60 on Emp/Pop). Model: assumes 0.85 avg Pop
effect over 80 years, 0.15 Emp/Pop effect
Long-run elasticities of local employment to population ratio with respect to once and for all local
employment shock, U.S. studies
Study

Long-run

Bartik (2015)

10-years

Bartik (1991)

Blanchard and Katz (1992)

Bartik (1993)

Bound and Holzer (2000)

Partridge and Rickman (2006)

Emp/Pop effect

Pop effect

At 4.0% unemployment rate (UR)

0.20

0.80

10-years

At 7.1% UR

0.34

0.66

10-years

At 10% UR

0.47

0.53

8 years

OLS

0.23

0.77

8 years

2SLS using demand shock instruments

0.37

0.63

8 years

0.07

0.93

17 years

0

1.00

8 years

0.28

0.72

17 years

0.25

0.75

High-school or less

0.24

0.76

College or more

0.12

0.88

Preferred estimates

0.21

0.79

Alternative estimates

0.42

0.58

Mean effect

0.14

0.86

10 years

10 years

Qualifications

Notowidigdo (2013)

10 years

Beaudry, Green and Sand (2014)

10 years

0.24

0.76

Amior and Manning (2018)

10 years

0.30

0.70
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Key consequence of persistent modest Emp/Pop effect
and significant Pop effect is low fiscal benefits relative
to earnings benefits
• Revenue will tend to go up a little slower than employment, due to
inelastic state and local taxes such as sales taxes and property
taxes, and relatively flat income taxes.

• Spending may go up a bit faster than population, due to
infrastructure costs. Model: assumes proportionate.
• Model: spending needs increase 92% as much as revenue.
• Consequence: persistent earnings effects end up being over 4 times
net fiscal benefits.
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Opportunity costs: some demand-side effects, some supply-side
effects of higher business taxes, but major possible effects of
reducing “productive” education spending

Ratio of local earnings effects to costs
8.08

5.72
5.06
3.31
2.13

Place-based college
scholarship

Child care for poor,
birth to 4

Public school spending
increases

Universal pre-K

Comm College
Workforce Ed
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Baseline model (2.5 multiplier; non-local businesses; 15% avg E/P effect;
net incentive costs financed 50% tax increases, 50% spending cuts, with
44% of tax increases from business taxes, 22% of spending cuts from K12): relatively modest effects on jobs for local residents.
Job effects of incentives as percentage of incented jobs
Net effects
But-for direct jobs

11.70

Plus multiplier jobs

28.71

Lost jobs due to higher local costs (e.g., wages, land)
Net jobs including multiplier and cost offsets

Sub-categories

(8.34)
20.37

Lost jobs due to D-side impact of paying for incentives

(1.84)

Lost jobs due to business tax increases

(1.08)

Lost jobs due to K-12 spending cuts

(1.00)

Net jobs including all effects

16.45

Net jobs going to local residents

2.49
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Baseline model: modest overall benefit-cost ratio of about 1.2

Benefits and costs as % of incentive costs
Revenue increases
Spending need increases

276.2
(253.1)

Net fiscal benefits

23.2

Exported business taxes

12.5

Higher earnings due to higher Emp/Pop

82.9

Higher earnings due to higher wages

19.7

Total higher earnings
Higher property values
Lost wages from K-12 cuts
Profit effects on local businesses

102.6
28.8
(38.1)
(6.7)

Net total

122.3

Benefit cost ratio (as proportion)

1.223
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Multiplier makes big difference (“holding all else constant”: if
higher multiplier just due to higher value-added per job, given
dollar incentive will be lower % of costs, lowering “but for”. So
really should focus on higher cluster multipliers)
How the Multiplier Affects the Benefit-Cost Ratio

3.98

1.22
0.44
Baseline (multiplier = 2.5)

Multiplier of 6

Multiplier of 1.5
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Increased local hiring of non-employed increases
incentive benefit-cost ratio
How Local Hiring Affects Incentive Benefits

1.62
1.22

Baseline local hiring (15%)

Higher local hiring (28%)
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Financing incentives by cutting productive services
has negative net effects – B/C ratio turns negative
Effects of Financing Incentives Via Reduced Education Spending

BASELINE( 11% FROM ED SPENDING)

100% FROM ED SPENDING

1.22

(3.43)
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Can focus on locally-owned, non-export-base firms
work? Yes if use cost-effective services AND
distributional effects are acceptable
Effects as Percent of Incentive Costs

Baseline
(non-local businesses)

Local businesses,
non-export base

Local businesses with
assumed service
effectiveness of 5-to-1

Fiscal benefits plus exported business costs

35.7

15.8

28.8

Labor market benefits

102.6

(3.4)

61.4

Property value benefits

28.8

(1.1)

16.2

Education cutbacks

(38.1)

(54.5)

(43.9)

Local business effects

(6.7)

80.7

322.5

Benefits as % of costs

122.3

37.5

385.1

Benefit-cost ratio

1.223

0.375

3.851
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Conclusion
•

Incentive benefits largely earnings, not fiscal.

•

“But for” for average incentives probably less than 25%, maybe much less.

•

Pop growth 70% plus of job growth, meaning that need for public services
increases by sizable % of revenue growth.

•

Higher cluster multiplier greatly increases B/C ratio.

•

Hiring local non-employed is what matters, not just hiring local.

•

Financing incentives via cuts in productive spending makes big difference.

•

Local business focus: details matter to whether this works.

•

This model can be adapted to different states, or its concepts can be
incorporated into other models.
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